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Reproductive behaviour has changed across the globe within the space of a century. Within this
short span of human history, people around the world have shifted from having large to  small
numbers  of  children.  This  transition  has  taken  place  under  very  different  local  conditions:
economic, political, social, cultural, and demographic. An enormous amount of work has gone into
understanding reproductive change, and current theories range from those emphasising the role of
specific  changes such  as  family planning programmes, female education  and  improved child
survival, to those stressing the role of broader ideational changes'. While all these explanations are
important, they leave us with an uncomfortable diversity of explanations for the same fundamental
shift in human behaviour. For both theoretical and policy purposes, it is useful to work towards an
underlying theory to explain this phenomenon, one with some predictive power. This is especially
important for the large parts of the world in which the transition is taking place slowly or is yet to
begin.
We  offer here  some  hypotheses which  may  contribute to  a  more  general  theory of  fertility
transition, with some predictive power as to what policies may affect the timing and speed of the
transition. Our hypotheses derive from the observation that the timing  and pace  of the fertility
transition correspond broadly with  changes in  socio-political institutions: whether we  look  at
regions of the world, regions of one continent such as Asia or regions of one country such as India.
This suggests that changes in reproductive behaviour form part of a much broader set of normative
and cognitive changes sweeping the globe, following from changes in socio-political institutions.
To  summarise our hypotheses, we  argue that critical changes in  reproductive motivations are
wrought  by  the  changes  in  socio-political institutions and  forms  of  govemance  which  have
gradually spread across the world over the past two centuries. The first component of these changes
is the breakdown of socio-political institutions based on deeply hierarchical social structures, which
circumscribe the scope for people to be socio-economically  mobile and to benefit (or lose) from the
consequences of their own decisions. Secondly, the establishment of modem governance helps this
process through the provision of law and order and other public goods which facilitate the use of
opportunities for mobility. Thirdly, some forms of govemance encourage participatory processes of
local decision-making, which further enhances the potential for people to be  socio-economiQally
mobile and to develop a sense of personal efficacy. These changes profoundly influence people's
ability and motivation to shape their own lives, including their reproductive lives.
Drawing on  recent literature  on the  effects of  institutional settings on the  pace  of economic
development2,  we suggest that the debate about the role of development in fertility decline may be
misspecified insofar as  it hinges  on whether various  forms of  development preceded  fertility
decline. It may well be that both socio-economic development and fertility transition are driven by
the same gamut of institutional changes. Thus, instead of expecting development consistently to
precede fertility decline, we should perhaps view the two sets of changes as associated but not
necessarily sequential in nature.
1Part of the reason for the present multiplicity of explanations for fertility decline lies in the fact that
the factors singled out are often highly embedded in the local circumstances of the setting studied,
and therefore focus on local-specific policies or forms of development. This leads to explanations
which are not always applicable to other settings. For example, while it is clear that family planning
programmes have played a very important role in accelerating the pace of fertility decline in many
developing countries, other countries have experienced decline without such programmes (Martine
1996). Similarly, while fertility decline is clearly accelerated by factors such as the spread of
education, health care and women's labour force participation outside the home, in many settings
indices of these factors have been at low levels when fertility decline began. The multiplicity of
current theories is also partly generated by differences in analytical methodologies, which can even
result in very different explanations for fertility change in the same location (Das Gupta 1996). This
makes it important to look beyond the blinkers placed by specific settings and methodologies in
understanding the fertility transition.
Some major theories have looked to more global changes to explain fertility decline. For example,
Notestein's (1953) well-known demographic transition theory spelt  out  a  list of  developments
accompanying industrialisation  and  urbanisation in  Europe which  changed the  incentives for
childbearing. This theory was challenged by the results of the Princeton group's work on European
historical demography, which failed to find any consistent thresholds in key development indicators
which preceded fertility decline (Coale and Watkins 1986). Their work indicated that the timing of
reproductive change differed between linguistic groups, giving rise  to the  suggestion that it is
influenced by communication of ideas and ideational change. In this vein, the 'wealth flows' theory
emphasises the role of Westernization in fertility decline (Caldwell 1976, 1978, 1980). More recent
work has focussed on the diffusion of a small family norm and information on means of fertility
control (Cleland and Wilson 1987, Pollak and Watkins 1993, Bongaarts and Watkins 1996). Others
have argued that the Princeton study was too quick to reject the socio-economic model of fertility
decline (Galloway et al.1994). Here we address this debate by trying to understand some of the
reasons underlying the widespread behavioural shift, why people choose to have smaller families.
Our hypotheses build on McNicoll and Cain's (1989) theory of the role of institutional structures
and local goverrment  in creating the conditions for fertility decline. They are also related to the
theory that fertility decline is influenced by ideational change and the diffusion of ideas. However,
we focus not on the diffusion of small family norms and contraceptive information, but on the
diffusion of  ideas at the level of socio-political change. The world has undergone radical changes
in socio-political systems during this period, and we argue that this may be related to changes in
reproductive behaviour. Our hypotheses are also clearly related to ideas of the relationship between-
fertility and 'modemisation'  or 'Westernisation', but they differ from these in their elucidation of
the processes underlying the connection between institutional and cognitive change.
We begin by summarising the explanations given for fertility transition in different parts of India.
This illustrates how, as the geographical and historical scope of analysis is widened, it becomes
possible to move beyond the immediate local-specific factors into a broader understanding of the
factors which speed or hinder fertility decline. We discuss how colonial administrative policies
helped shape current regional differences in socio-political institutions and cultures of governance,
2which in turn influence the wide regional differentials in the pace of socio-economic demographic
change. In the second section, we discuss our hypotheses, summarised above, about the factors
underlying the global change in reproductive behaviour.
I  EXPLANATIONS OF FERTILITY DECLINE IN INDIA
1. Reasons  given  for fertility decline  in various  parts of  India
Studies of India present a wide diversity of explanations for fertility decline. Perhaps because it is
such a heterogenous country, in-depth studies of fertility in India tend to focus on a particular part
of the country rather than the country as a whole. Here we review the explanations put forward for
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Maharashtra, and for the slowness of the decline in the central
states of the country. These explanations seem at first sight to be quite different from each other,
but we shall argue that the underlying causes are similar across the country.
One of the striking features of fertility decline in India is the wide regional differences in the timing
and pace of the transition. By 1991, Kerala and Tamil Nadu in south India approached replacement
fertility levels and the majority of states had moderate fertility levels of around 3 children per
woman, while the central states continued to have high fertility levels of around 4.5 - 5 children per
woman.  Compared with the rest of the country, fertility transition in the central states not only
began later, but also is proceeding more slowly (Table 1).
Kerala's fertility and mortality rates approach those of developed countries, an achievement which
is especially remarkable in view of the state's lack of prosperity in comparison with the rest of India,
let  alone developed countries. Kerala  is therefore  often held up  as a  model  of what  can be
accomplished in  low-income settings given a political commitment to  human development, in
particular to providing universal education and health care. Efforts in this direction began as early
as the nineteenth century, when the ruler of the princely state of Travancore-Cochin proclaimed that
universal education and health care were desirable goals and began to set up schools and encourage
missionaries to do the same. By the late nineteenth century quite substantial proportions of the
population were educated, mostly amongst the higher castes. In the early decades of the twentieth
century, education was spread actively to the lower castes (Krishnan 1995, 1996). The spread of
health care also seems to have had some success (Krishnan 1995).
Social movements played an important role in this transition. Movements for religious reform in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gradually broke down the rigidities of the caste system
and loosened up traditional hierarchies. The lower castes in Kerala were active in measures such as
establishing universal rights  of access to  temples,  and using  educational facilities to  establish-
upward social and economic mobility. Kerala has also had several socialist movements, such as
those to keep wage levels high and to protect workers' welfare. The population is almost universally
literate and  high proportions read  newspapers on a  regular basis  and use  the public  libraries
available to both urban and rural areas. As a result, people are highly politicised and are able to
organise political pressure to ensure that public services such as health facilities are well run. These
achievements are especially impressive in view of the fact that traditional social organisation in
Kerala was amongst the most deeply inegalitarian in India.
3While Kerala  presents an impressive  example  of the 'human development'  path of demographic
transition,  Punjab  represents  the path of economic  development  with relatively  little attention  paid
to social development  until the late 1960s.  Yet fertility  began to decline in Punjab in the 1940s
(Figure 1), around  the same time as in Kerala 3, though at a considerably  slower  pace. The decline
began in Punjab  almost  a quarter  of a century  before  the spread of education  and the extension  of
the health  and family  planning  programme.  At that  time infant  mortality  was over 150  per  thousand,
levels of literacy were negligible, and there was virtually no access to modem contraception.
Moreover,  though agricultural  yields were rising steadily,  levels of living in Punjab in the 1940s
remained  relatively  low as compared  with the affluence  generated  by the recent  Green  Revolution.
This fertility decline seems to  have been triggered by colonial efforts to promote economic
development  in Punjab.  In particular  an ambitious  effort to construct  canals and wells to bring
irrigation to  this  arid land was very  successful in  raising agricultural productivity. More
importantly,  assured  irrigation  stabilised  yields,  making  for a new security  of life and livelihood  for
all strata of the population,  and increasing  stability  of expectations  (Das Gupta 1995).  These were
critical  factors  enabling  people  to reduce  fertility  in response  to the pressure  on resources  caused  by
mortality  decline.  Fertility  was reduced using traditional  methods including  postponing  marriage
and terminal abstinence,  and the advent of modem contraception  since the 1960s facilitated  this
considerably.
Tamil Nadu has the second lowest fertility rate in India and is also approaching  replacement
fertility.  There is less consensus  about  the reasons  for fertility  decline  in Tamil  Nadu than in Kerala.
This state has gone down the path of social development  mixed with economic development
(Kishor  1994,  Rarnasundaram  1995).  Levels  of education  and mortality  are not as favourable  as in
Kerala, but compare  favourably  with the rest of India. Tamil Nadu underwent  steady industrial
growth  during  the 1950s  and 1960s,  and  became  one of the more  industrialised  and urbanised  states
of the country  (Kishor  1994, Ramasundaram  1995).  During  this period,  public irrigation  facilities
were expanded,  raising agricultural  productivity  and laying  the basis for a further  rapid rise in
production  when the inputs of the Green  Revolution  became  available.  Despite  these efforts,  Tamil
Nadu  ranks below  average  amongst  Indian  states  in per capita  income.
Turning  to social development  initiatives,  levels of literacy,  including  female literacy,  have risen
rapidly  in Tamil  Nadu during  recent decades,  and as Kishor (1994)  points out, the emphasis  has
been on spreading  elementary  education.  Other equity-oriented  efforts abound in the state. Land
reform,  tenancy  legislation  and wage legislation  were passed,  aimed  at protecting  the poor (Kishor.
1994,  Ramasundaram  1995).  Health service  provision  has been greatly expanded,  and innovative
nutritional  supplement  programmes  carried  out. Since  1982,  there has been a free lunch  programme
for children  aged 2-10 years registered  in child welfare  centres  and elementary  schools,  which is
found  to have improved  diets and reduced  poverty  (Kishor  1994).  Tamil Nadu also has a record  of
aggressive  affirmative  action  efforts  to raise  the status  of the lower social classes (Ramasundaram
1995,  Bhat 1997).
Some  have argued  that Tamil  Nadu's  fertility  decline  is 'poverty-driven' 4. This argument  seems to
hinge not on an absolute reduction of living standards,  but on aspirations rising faster than
household  resources.  Kishor,  for example  argues  that the poor  have been left with no choice but to
4shift over to investing in their children's education to enter the urban job market. Rising aspirations
give further impetus to the need to reduce family size. This argument, of course, is premised on the
availability of jobs in the urban areas, which itself is indicative of economic growth and the spread
of economic opportunities.
Mari Bhat (1996) finds no evidence that Tamil Nadu's fertility decline is 'poverty-led'. His analysis
points out that the electronic media are especially widespread in Tamil Nadu, and that in this state
media  exposure has  an  especially strong inverse relationship with  fertility. Another argument
sometimes put forward is that the decline is due to an  especially active and innovative family
planning programme, but this argument has also been dismissed in recent analyses (RamasundaramYi
1995, Bhat 1997). It seems that Tamil Nadu's fertility decline is driven by a combination of social
development policies and new opportunities for mobility and raising aspirations.
In his comparison of Maharashtra and Bangladesh in the late 1970s, Cain (1981) emphasised the
contrast between the institutional structures in the two settings. In particular, he drew attention to
Maharashtra's efforts  to  generate employment and  provide  credit,  and  the  relatively  smooth
operation of the legal system in protecting property rights. He attributed the more advanced fertility
transition in Maharashtra as compared with Bangladesh to  the security brought about by these
aspects of administrative order, along with the relatively greater autonomy of women.
Many of the apparent contradictions between the explanations of fertility decline in various parts of
India are resolved when these are contrasted with the central states of the country. These states
show the slowest fertility decline and are the most disadvantaged in economic as well as social
development. They have  the  lowest per  capita income  levels in  the  country  and  show poor
performance on agricultural as well as industrial development indicators. Eastern Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar are the  worst outliers on  these fronts. Maternal  and  child mortality rates remain  high,
illiteracy is high and the family planning programme is viewed as performing poorly. Satia and
Jejeebhoy (1991) conclude that these various aspects of underperformance reinforce each other.
This suggests that whether states have placed greater emphasis on economic development or on
social development  is  of  far  less  consequence  than  whether they  have  placed  emphasis on
development at all. Both forms of development have in common the feature that they make for
greater security of life and aspiration to improved living conditions, thus motivating and enabling
people to plan under conditions of far less uncertainty about the future 5. The shift is from a mindset
in which  people respond to  circumstances as they arise, to  one  in  which  they feel they can
reasonably direct the course of their lives, including the number of children they would like to raise.
Both forms of development, then, can bring about the onset of fertility decline. However, the--
comparison of Kerala and Punjab indicates that the pace of the decline is more rapid where social
development proceeds more rapidly.
2. The influence of administrative policies in colonial India (presentday India,  Bangladesh and
Pakistan)
The roots of some of the variation in the timing of demographic transition in different regions of
India can be traced to administrative policies during the colonial period. The nature of the colonial
5administration  differed  across  India,  and deeply  influenced  the nature  of local economic,  social and
political  institutions.  Perhaps  the most imnportant  way  in which  the colonial  administration  differed
across  India, from this point of view, was the method of collecting  revenue.  The land settlement
laid  out  the basic  framework  for revenue  collection.
In some parts of the country,  such as the eastern  and central  region including  Bengal,  Bihar and
Eastern Uttar Pradesh,  the arrangement  was to have large landowners  (zamindars,  talukdars)  who
were responsible  for payment of the revenue. This system was deeply hierarchical,  with the
landowners  being far removed  from actual cultivation  and living off rent collected from tenant
farmers.  The landowners  formed part of the local elite, and had a virtual monopoly  of power in
local  institutions.
These  hierarchical  power structures  persist  to a substantial  extent even  today in Bihar and Eastern
Uttar Pradesh,  where economic  and political  power are still  highly concentrated  and the elite have
considerable  success  in slowing  down  the pace of state efforts  to transform  the local economy  and
society.  These are the parts of India which are most poorly administered,  largely because of the
pressures  from local elites. state interventions  to bring  education,  health and agricultural  and other
development  have  met with limited  success  in these areas  as compared  with the rest of the country,
because  the elites  have  strong  vested  interests  in maintaining  the old hierarchies.
In  West Bengal, political pressures made for  the  abandonment of  these  structures after
Independence.  Much has been done since then to sweep away their residual effects  through  the
spread  of education,  organisation  of active  participation  by people  in local political  processes,  land
reform,  agricultural  development  and other forms of development.  West Bengal has experienced
substantial  fertility  decline.  In East  Bengal  (presentday  Bangladesh)  these tenurial  systems  began  to
break down after Partition,  as the large landowners  were mostly  Hindus who left at the time of
Partition.
After Bangladesh  became independent,  more concerted  administrative  efforts, both public and
private,  have come into place.  This is evident  in the recent  growth  rates of the economy  and in the
reduction  of mortality  rates from the natural disasters  which beset the country (Das Gupta and
Narayana  1996).  When researchers  such as Cain (1977)  first went to study Bangladesh,  this was
shortly after Independence  and in the wake of a major famine,  so they were struck by the harsh
environment  of risk which gives incentives  for high fertility.  Since then much has been done to
reduce  the environment  of risk with water management,  disaster  relief and other strategies,  and to
diversify  sources  of income for people  (Hossain  1992,  Cleland  et al. 1994).  Much of Bangladesh's
developmc-nt  effort  has been  highly  participatory  (Bardhan  1996,  Crook  and Manor 1994),  and this-
may  help explain  the striking  fertility  decline  that  has recently  taken place  there. The translation  of a.
latent demand into actuality has  been greatly facilitated by  improved access to  modern
contraception.
In other  parts of present-day  India,  including  Punjab  and Haryana  and much  of the south,  there  was
a more egalitarian  form of land settlement,  in which revenue  was collected  directly  from peasant
owner-cultivators.  In these areas  there was far less concentration  of landholding  and economic  and
social  power,  and the beneficial  effects  of this are visible  even  today in the greater effectiveness  of
6state interventions and the dynamism of a local economy in which people have an incentive to
invest in increasing production. Whether one looks at the spread of education, the functioning of
health centres, or agricultural growth, these more egalitarian economic structures show far greater
success than the central region of the country where deeply unequal structures still linger.
There was also considerable variation in the extent to which the colonial administration actively
tried to develop the local economy. The Province of Punjab (including presentday Indian Punjab,
Haryana and Pakistan's Punjab Province) had an especially committed administration in this regard.
This may have been motivated partly by the fact that this was the part of the country from which it
was felt that the most loyal troops could be recruited for the army. Also, Punjab had vast anrd  tracfs
which, with investrnent in irrigation, could be turned into a very fertile region. The construction of
an ambitious system of canals and the spread of irrigation was rewarded by this region becoming a
major source of grain exports and revenue generation.
While  the whole  of  Punjab  benefited greatly from  the  developmental efforts  of the  colonial
government, there were important differences within the region. The western part of Punjab (now in
Pakistan) was arid and thinly populated, while population density was higher in areas further east
(now in India). It was the western part which was opened up by the canals into what were called the
Canal Colonies. Here large tracts of newly canal-irrigated land were granted to settlers brought in
from eastern Punjab, and these became the breadbasket of colonial India and the source of massive
wheat exports to other countries (Darling 1947). The other parts of Punjab (now mostly in India)
were already settled, and were largely dominated by peasant owner-cultivators. The middle part of
the region (now Indian Puniab) also benefited from some of the canal irrigation, but also from well
irrigation. The easternmost part (now Indian Haryana) was the most densely populated, with small
landholdings and the least development of canal irrigation.  It was the part of Punjab most subject to
famine during the colonial period, and continues today to be less prosperous than Indian Punjab.
Thus the parts of Punjab province which fall in presentday Pakistan came to be dominated by large
powerful landowners, whereas those which fall in presentday India were largely the domain of
peasant owner-cultivators with more egalitarian social structures. This may help to explain why the
fertility transition has occurred much more rapidly in Indian Punjab  than in  Pakistani Punjab,
although fertility levels were similar before Independence (Dyson 1996). There is also a historical
difference between Indian Punjab and Haryana, with the latter being subject to insecurity for longer
than the former. This may help to explain why Haryana's fertility decline has lagged somewhat
behind that of Indian Punjab.
3. Towards a synthesis of explanationsforfertility  decline in India
The Indian experience suggests that growing pressure of population on resources generated a latent
demand for reducing family size, but that improved security of life and new aspirations for mobility
were important for enabling people to respond to their perceived pressure on resources. The most
rapid fertility decline has been in those parts of the country characterised by more egalitarian
economic and political institutions, and better governance as reflected in development outcomes
and a stable legal order. These are also the parts of the country with the most participatory processes
of  development.  During  the  pre-Independence era,  this  was  especially  true  of  Punjab  and
7Travancore-Cochin (parts of present-day Kerala), although they laid different emphases on social
versus economic goals.
In the  central states, power remained more concentrated and the  scope for mobility low, and
reproductive behaviour has been slower to change. These states are characterised by considerably
poorer governance than the rest of the country. This is reflected in virtually any indicator one
chooses to examine: including low levels of education, high child mortality rates, slow fertility
decline, poor utilisation of water tables for irrigation, low agricultural wages, and low levels of
industrialisation. The environment of risk in  daily life remains far  higher in these states than
elsewhere, whether in earning a livelihood or one's children's survival chances. These are the only
parts of the country where dacoits continue to flourish, frequently supported by or even drawn from
local elites, where female health workers have to be careful of their movements, and where local
landlords continue to use physical force to keep wages low. All this is despite the fact that the basic
sectors of health and education and legal and administrative institutions are designed to be uniform
throughout the country.
As  we  argue above, historical  factors have helped  shape  regional  differences  in  patterns of
governance, and these in turn have influenced the pace of socio-economic and demographic change.
There is considerable overlap between the states with slower fertility transition and poorer child
health,  poorer  reproductive  health  services,  lower  literacy,  less  industrialization  and  less
administrative efficiency (as measured by the coverage of the vital registration system) (Table 1).
People are less enabled to control fertility not only because they have less access to education,
health and family planning services, but also because their lives are far less secure and amenable to
improvement through personal efforts than elsewhere in the country. Fortunately there are many
pressures operating against the continued dominance of local elites in these regions, so positive
changes are taking place, albeit painfully slowly.
II  INSIGHTS FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
The timing of fertility decline in different parts of the world sheds light on what policies helped
alter people's reproductive behaviour. Figure 2 shows that the timings of country-specific declines
are clustered by region. Thus Western European countries experienced their transition around the
late nineteenth to  early twentieth century: some countries were earlier and some were later, but
(with the exception of France) they all fall within a broad band of decline around the same time.
Next came countries in Latin America and Asia, whose fertility decline began in the mid-twentieth
century, and some of these have now reached quite low levels of fertility while others continue to
have moderate fertility. Sub-Saharan Africa is not shown here, as decline has begun only recently in-
some countries and not yet in others.
This raises the question of what might have caused this regional clustering. The timing of fertility
decline  coincides  broadly  with  that  of  the  development  of  modern  states  with  modern
administrative institutions, suggesting that these  may have influenced reproductive behaviour.
France was the first to experience the ideological upsurge that led to the demise of its monarchy, as
well as the earliest onset of a  secular decline in fertility. Most of the rest of Western Europe
experienced this  socio-political shift over half  a  century later,  that  is  around the  mid to  late
8nineteenth century, and  experienced fertility decline from  around the  late  nineteenth century
(Knodel and van de Walle 1986). Most of the rest of the world underwent these socio-political
changes around the mid-twentieth century, and fertility decline also started very roughly after that.
Within Asia also, regional differences in the timing and pace of fertility decline (Figure 3) indicate
that they may be influenced by the nature of governance, as discussed above in the context of India.
Around 1950, most Asian countries had a total fertility of around 6, but their subsequent paces of
fertility decline were very different, generating a wide range in fertility levels by 1995. Some Asian
countries now have some of the lowest fertility rates in the world, while others have some of the
highest. Differences within South Asia are just as wide, with Sri Lanka at 2.3 and Pakistan at 5.21.
The same is true within India, where total fertility in 1991 ranged from 1.8 in Kerala to 5.2 in Uttar
Pradesh 7: within a single country, levels of fertility are amongst the lowest in the world in some
regions and amongst the highest in others.
These differences within Asia seem to correspond with differences in socio-political institutions, as
indicated by the nature of land tenure and agrarian relations; differences in the operation of the state
as indicated by law and order; and differences in the extent to which local decision-making takes
place  through  participatory  processes.  We  describe  below  how  these  factors  may  influence
reproductive behaviour.
1. Shift away  from  hierarchical  socio-political order:
During  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries,  most  of  the  world  underwent  profound
transformation in  relations  of  political  economy, accompanied  by  changes  in  the  nature  of
administration. Earlier relations of political economy, based on deeply hierarchical social structures,
were  gradually replaced by  those  associated with  modern states 8. These earlier socio-political
structures were based on a concentration of social, economic and political power in the hands of
local elites, who were typically responsible for collecting revenue and administering local justice.
They  operated  on  multistranded  ties  of  patronage  with  the  local  peasants.  States gradually
undermined the power of these elites and dealt with the populace directly. Some historians argue
that this was motivated by a need to tax citizens directly in order to finance modem warfare (Weiss
and Hobson 1995). In the process, they established direct administrative ties with their citizens.
Hobsbawm (1990:83)  calls this  process  'the  creation of  the  modem,  administrative, citizen-
mobilizing and citizen-influencing state'.
The modern state tends towards an egalitarian orientation because in order to acquire legitimacy4-it
must invest in some aspects of their citizens' welfare. It needs to foster citizens' compliance in its
military and economic endeavours, and to ensure citizens fitness for these purposes (Hobsbawm--
1990, de Swaan 1988). This motivates states to invest in the health and education of the populace.
In most West European countries, much emphasis has been given since the late nineteenth century
to matters such as improving citizen's housing, nutrition, education, health education, public health,
and sanitation. In much of the developing world, these processes began several decades later.
These changes destroy pre-existing relations of political economy and fundamentally alter people's
lives. In the hierarchical relations of political economy, ties of obligations between overlords and
their underlings often provided the latter some measure of insurance while severely circumscribing
9individual mobility. The combination of patronage and exploitation 9 which this entails means that
people do not live with the implications of their own choices and actions, for better or for worse.
The personalised sources of insurance are highly elastic, offering greater support when times are
very bad and less when they are better. For the patron, this ensures their clients' continued survival
and availability for work. For the clients, it blurs perception of the costs and benefits of alternate
courses of action. Constraints on mobility and aspirations add to people's sense of limited ability to
improve their lives through their own actions. When these ties end, some important constraints on
mobility are lifted, along with  the generalised insurance: creating both  the possibility and the
incentive to try to improve one's own situation'0.
From the point of view of altering reproductive behaviour, both  the positive and the negative
aspects of these changes are significant. They have profound effects on raising personal efficacy,
enabling people to shape their own future, while also forcing them to absorb to a greater degree the
consequences of their own actions. While obligations remain elastic, people under-intemalise the
costs of child-bearing. This has been pointed out in the case of family systems which allow the
costs of childbearing to be spread beyond the parents (Davis 1955, McNicoll and Cain 1989), and
we extend this idea to the sphere of socio-economic structures. The possibility of mobility adds
further to people's need to consider their reproduction carefully.
Other changes during this period work in the same direction of less elastic obligations and increased
mobility. For example, the shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy dramatically reduces the
scope for disguised unemployment. It also entails a shift from working relations based on sustained
social ties to  contractual relations. At the same time,  other sources of elastic obligations may
continue to exist, for example within the kinship group or community (such as common property
resources). A different kind of elasticity can also prevail if, for example, new land can be opened up
relatively easily for cultivation.
2. Establishment of modern governance:
This fundamental transformation in socio-political structures is linked with the establishment of
modem governance. As mentioned above, the activities of a modem state influence the daily life of
ordinary  people in ways unthinkable in earlier times. A central feature of this is the establishment of
law and order and of policing as a public good. This can exist even where the rule of law is very
weak, as for example in totalitarian and many authoritarian regimes: conversely, Bihar in India is a
good example of a place which has rule of law but very poor law and order. When security becomes
a public good as  opposed to  a private good, people become less dependent on  social ties -fo
protecting such things as property. Also important for increased security are measures improving
public health and stabilising food availability. These reduce the sudden mortality peaks  which-
constitute such a capricious threat to people's lives. Thus in many ways people in most settings have
more security of life and livelihood today, despite losing erstwhile sources of generalised insurance.
Other institutional innovations brought  about by the public or private  sector make for greater
economic growth and  security. These include the creation of modem  infrastructure for credit,
transport, marketing and communications. The spread of education also increases people's ability to
shape their  lives. Informal insurance mechanisms, embedded  in  personalised ties with  elastic
obligations, are gradually substituted by  more impersonal institutions.  This  also  increases the
10potential for socio-economic mobility, and with this the need to plan family size more precisely. An
unusually detailed study of Prussia during 1875-1910 brings out the importance of these kinds of
institutional innovation for fertility decline (Galloway et al.  1994).
The specifics of the change vary considerably, as the manifestations of modem governance may
take very different paths. One obvious difference is that modem administrations may have different
policy objectives. As  the Indian  case shows,  in  some  settings policies  may focus  on  social
development, while elsewhere they emphasise economic growth. These different paths have quite
different ramifications apart from the obvious differences in the quality of life. For example, social
development  is  more  likely  to  foster  gender  equality  and  social  equality  than  economic
development. As suggested by the more rapid fertility decline in Kerala than Punjab state of India,
social development may also  be  associated with  more rapid growth  of personal  efficacy, and
consequently more rapid  demographic transition.  Thus the  specifics  of the  forms of  modem
governance can differ considerably and affect the pace of demographic transition.
3. Participatory  processes of local governance:
One important aspect of governance which we hypothesise influences the fertility transition is the
organisation  of  local  government.  Recent  work'  1 on  the  role  of  institutions  in  economic
development stresses that  systems of governance which  foster participatory processes in local
decision-making and local  accountability are more successful in  achieving development goals.
Some forms of bureaucratic organisation are better at generating the synergy  between the public and
private sectors which increase people's ability to influence developmental outcomes and accelerate
growth  (Evans  1995,  1996). There  is  good  reason  for  expecting that  such  settings will  be
characterised by better outcomes in several spheres, ranging from health and education to irrigation
and credit. Putnam (1993) found this to be the case in Italy. He even found that infant mortality
rates in different regions of Italy in the 1970s were predicted far better by initial differences (at the
turn of the century) in social capital than by initial differences in infant mortality rates at that time.
Note that democracy at the national level and participatory development with local accountability
do not necessarily go hand in hand (Bardhan 1996; Isham et al.1995), although democratic regimes
lend themselves more obviously to the checks and balances required for the maintenance of civil
society  and  modem  governance.  Several  authoritarian  regimes  have  been  oriented  towards
economic and social development, and have proved effective in establishing modem governance.
At the same time, some democratic regimes have been poor at creating participatory institutions af
governance, particularly at local levels.
For example, Wade (1982, 1985, 1997) concludes that participatory development at the local level
was  far  better  ensured  under  South  Korea's  military  dictatorship than  under  India's  elected
government. This is reflected in the greater effectiveness of the organisation of the South Korean
irrigation system, which make for greater responsiveness of local irrigation officials to farmers'
needs  than  in  India.  Evans  (1995)  comes  to  similar  conclusions  in  comparing  industrial
development outcomes  in  South Korea  and  India. In the same vein, Dreze  and  Saran (1993)
conclude that China's better performance than India in primary education is attributable largely to
better institutions of local accountability in such matters in China.
11We extend this idea to argue that more participatory local governance is also conducive to more
rapid fertility decline. This is partly because more rapid development enlarges the scope for socio-
economic mobility, and partly because greater participation in local government sharpens people's
perception of the connection between their own actions and their well-being. This hypothesis is
consistent with the evidence from Asia, where regional differences in the extent of participation in
local decision-making seem to  correspond with differences in the pace  of both  socio-economic
development and demographic transition.
For example, East Asian countries such as South Korea and China were ravaged by war in the micd-
twentieth century, but ironically this facilitated land reform and some critical decentralisation of
local  decision-making which  have helped  them  greatly in  their  subsequent  development. By
contrast, India has experienced much more political and administrative stability, with the negative
consequence that some areas remain quite feudal in nature and others  have shown inadequate
success in  fostering local  accountability. We hypothesise that  this  helps  explain  why fertility
transition has been more rapid in East Asia than in  South Asia, as well as the striking regional
differences in fertility transition within South Asia (Figure 3).
4. The role of technological change  in accelerating the pace  offertility  decline:
Developmental efforts were given an enormous boost from the late nineteenth century onwards by
scientific advances  on  many  fronts.  Improved engineering techniques  and  materials  made  it
possible to build infrastructure such as railroads, dams and canals on a scale never imaginable
earlier. This reduced people's susceptibility to risk  in  a variety of  ways, such  as by reducing
dependence on rainfall and making it possible to transport food to  avert famine. Radically new
medical discoveries enabled effective intervention to improve public health and dramatically reduce
the risk of sudden death which had till then always beset humanity.
Accompanying these scientific advances was a great surge of confidence in man's ability to master
nature. This was a radical departure from previous ideologies which were necessarily based on a
more resigned acceptance of the vagaries of nature. It is a truly heady idea, that mankind can control
its own destiny, and that many human problems can be resolved through technological means.
Colonial administrators commented on the psychological sea-change brought about by the advent
of canal irrigation in northern India:
The whole framework and order of society are changed, and men are no longer entirely at
the mercy of nature and of fate...  .The man-made canal is beginning to take the place of fate
in men's minds, and it is only a step from this to realize that if man can make the canal, he
can make much else besides; and that it is not 'as God wills' but as man works that he will
be rich or poor...  .The change is one the subtlest influences now coming into play, and as it
spreads, will do more than anything else to make agricultural progress possible. (Darling
1947:146-147, originally published in 1925)
Thus a dramatic set of scientific advances altered not only people's ability but also their perception
of their ability to shape their own lives, including their reproductive lives.
12More recent scientific advances have also had enormous impact on the pace of fertility decline. An
obvious example is the advances in contraceptive technology, which has dramatically reduced the
effort involved in preventing births. The mass media offer a very direct example of how new
technology can accelerate fertility decline. By bringing radically new information and messages into
people's homes, the media are able to act in many subtle ways to accelerate the pace of change of
group norms. For example, in the absence of media, group norms can be  expected to change
gradually, as some individuals in a community realise the potential benefits of reducing fertility. As
their children grow and the famnily  is apparently successful in their new strategy, others will follow
their example. With the advent of the media, this entire process can be speeded up. For example, a
soap opera can introduce demographic innovators simultaneously in every community, and within a
few weeks show that their children grew up successfully. Thus the media simultaneously introduce
demographic innovators and their instant success, which accelerates the pace of change of group
reproductive norms. New contraceptive and media technology have helped  make the  pace of
fertility decline more rapid in countries starting their decline in the mid-twentieth century than in
those that began before this.
CONCLUSIONS
The nature of our understanding of the factors underlying fertility decline is deeply affected by the
analytical methodologies used, and by the historical and geographical scope of the analysis, as we
illustrate here. Apparently very different theories emerge from studies carried out in different parts
of India: we are told that the key factor in Kerala was social development, while in Punjab it was
economic development, in Maharashtra modem institutional structures and in Tamil Nadu some
combination of these.
Yet these diverse explanations have an  underlying commonality, namely  that in  India fertility
transition has taken place where established socio-economic and political hierarchies have been
shaken up, increasing the scope for individual mobility, security and control over life. Conversely,
the slowest development and demographic transition are seen in regions which are still controlled
by powerful landowners. It is of course in the interest of these landowning elites to maintain their
power  by  subverting processes  which would  increase people's security and  personal  efficacy.
Perhaps this is also one reason why Pakistan has experienced such slow fertility decline.
Moving to the still larger canvas of global fertility decline, we observe that the timing of fertility
decline in  different regions  of the  world corresponds broadly with  changes  in  socio-political
institutions. We hypothesise that fertility decline is related to these changes, which have led in--
various ways to  lifting constraints on  mobility and enabling people  to  shape  their own lives,
internalising more of the positive and negative implications of their  decisions, including their
reproductive decisions. This has also been powerfully helped by the success of modem science in
giving mankind a sense of control over its own destiny.
One change which is crucial in this respect is the breakdown of deeply hierarchical socio-political
institutions, which brings the possibility of equality of opportunity and of socio-economic mobility.
Another important change is the establishment of modem governance, a central feature of which is
13the establishment of law and order and of policing as a public good. This can exist even where the
rule of law is very weak, as in most  authoritarian states, while conversely Bihar state of India
illustrates that it is possible to have very poor law and order despite having rule of law. Modem
governance brings security and predictability of life and livelihood through impersonal institutions,
which is crucial for people to plan their lives.
Polities which are successful in fostering local accountability and participation in decision making
show  the  most  successful  development outcomes  of  several kinds,  ranging from  health  and
education to irrigation and credit. This does not necessarily go hand in hand with democracy at the
national level, as recent studies comparing India with South Korea and China emphasise' 2. We
observe that such polities also seem to show the most rapid demographic transition. This is perhaps
partly because they increase people's sense of personal efficacy and partly because they increase the
pace of development and thereby the scope for benefiting from changing reproductive behaviour.
We hypothesise that this helps explain the striking differentials in the pace of fertility transition
between different regions of India, and between the countries of East and South Asia.
Drawing on the recent literature on the relationship between institutional settings and the pace of
13-eooideeomn economic  development  ,  we  suggest  that  several  aspects  of  socio-economic  development
(including fertility transition) may be driven by the same underlying forces of institutional change.
If  true,  this  has  an  important implication for  our  understanding of  the  relationship  between
development and fertility decline: namely, that while they can be expected to be associated with
each other, they are not necessarily sequential in nature. Thus, for  example, we  should not be
surprised to find fertility declining when levels of infant mortality are still relatively high or when
standards of living are still quite low, as has empirically been the case in large parts of the world.
Our hypotheses also suggest that entire communities are likely to  experience changes in child-
bearing incentives at much the same time, and we should not necessarily expect large behavioural
lags between different strata of a given community' 4.
The ideas put forward here are speculative. They represent a step towards understanding why a
secular decline in fertility should have taken place across the globe within such a short span of
human history, and why there seems to be a broad correspondence between the advent of political
and institutional changes in different parts of the world and the timing and pace of fertility decline.
If our hypotheses are valid, they indicate that policies to  ensure more local accountability and
decentralisation  of development will effect a 'win-win'  situation of more rapid development as well
as more rapid demographic transition. Conversely, a paucity of such policies will result in the 'lose,-
lose' situation that parts of South Asia appear to face.
14NOTES
See for example  Bongaarts  and Watkins (1996), Caldwell  (1976, 1978, 1990),  Cleland et al.(1994),  Cleland and Wilson
(1987),  Cleland  et al.(l994), Coale  and Watkins (1986),  Notestein  (1953),  Lesthaeghe  (1983)  and Pollak  and Watkins  (1993).
See for example  Evans (1995, 1996),  Wade (1982, 1985,  1997),  Putnam  (1993),  Isham et al.(l995) and Bardhan  (1996).
3  The age-distribution  of Kerala  indicates  that fertility  decline  began in the 1940s.
4Kishor  (1994). See also Mencher  (1980)  and Basu (1986).
This  is akin to Coale's  (1973)  concept  of fertility  control  entering  people's 'calculus of conscious  choice'.
6 World Bank (1997).
7Registrar-General  of India, Sample  Registration  System 1991.
8See  for example  Skocpol  (1994),  Weiss and Hobson  (1995), Hobsbawm  (1975, 1990),  Moore (1978, 1993). Africa  may
be an exception  to this argument  because  socio-economic  relations there were far more egalitarian  than in most of Europe  or
Asia. Arguably, many African  societies have moved towards  greater hierarchy during this century. In the case of Africa, a
major source of elasticity  is land availability:  the phenomenon  of land shortage and carefully  defined property rights which
have long been common  in Europe and Asia is a recent feature  in much of Africa.
9 This wonderfully  apt phrase  is the title  of Jan Breman's  (1974)  book.
10  One example  of this is the sharp rise in agricultural  productivity  that frequently  takes place when land tenurial  systems
move  towards owner-cultivation  (Hobsbawm  1975,  Banerjee  and Ghatak 1996).
"  See references  in footnote  2.
12  See especially  Bardhan (1996),  Wade (1997),  Dreze and Saran  (1993),  Isham et al.(1995)  and Evans (1995).
'  See references  in footnote  2.
14  This is consistent  with Cleland's  (1993) observation  that fertility decline  sweeps through all socio-economic  strata  of a
region with little of the lag which would be expected  if indeed people were finetuning  their decisions in response to their
individual  circumstances.
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YearTable I.  Indices of fertility and development, major States of India
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
% Main  Workers,  1991:'  From  live  births.  19B8-19924
% decline  In  Female  Primary  Tertiary  % coverage  of  %  antenatal % deliveries  assisted  % of  women  not
Total  Fertility  TFR  from  Infant  Mortality  LUteracy  Sector  Sector  birth  registration,  care  by allopathic  doctor  regularly  exposed  to
Rate,  19911 1971-1991'  Rate,  19921  Rate,  19912  1981'  or nurse)midwife  any  media,  1992-93'
South:
Andhra  Pradesh  3.0  34.78  71  32.72  71.25  18.27  65  86.3  49.3  24.8
Kamataka  3.1  29.55  73  44.34  67.37  19.46  71  83.5  50.9  29.9
Kerala  1.8  56.10  17  86.17  48.02  33.81  76  97.3  89.7  20.8
Tamil  Nadu  2.2  43.59  58  51.33  61.81  22.01  78  94.2  71.2  22.0
North-Centre:
Bihar  4.4  n.a.  73  22.89  82.36  13.00  20  36.8  19.0  70.5
Madhya  Pradesh  4.6  17.86  104  28.85  77.54  14.09  58  52.1  30.0  59.0
Rajasthan  4.6  26.98  90  20.44  71.63  18.50  19  31.2  21.8  69.9
Uttar  Pradesh  5.1  22.73  98  25.31  73.01  18.01  21  44.7  17.2  64.5
North West:
Haryana  4.0  40.30  75  40.47  58.84  27.98  66  72.7  30.3  39.9
Punjab  3.1  40.38  56  50.41  56.08  29.08  80  87.9  48.3  34.5
West:
Gujarat  3.1  44.64  67  48.64  59.76  22.38  87  75.7  42.5  44.6
Maharashtra  3.0  34.78  59  52.32  61.51  22.69  74  82.7  53.2  37.2
East:
Orissa  3.3  29.79  115  34.68  75.83  16.66  53  61.6  20.5  60.5
West  Bengal  3.2  n.a.  65  46.56  56.49  25.69  46  75.3  33.0  38.7
INDIA  3.6  30.77  79  39.19  67.37  20.50  53  62.3  34.2  47.3
Sources:
'Sample  Registrabon  System,  1970-75,  1991,  1992
2Primary  Census  Abstract  of  India,  Paper  2 of 1992,  pp.  57 and  169-174.
'Das Gupta,  1996;  Calculated  as  birth  rate  from Vital  Registration  System,  1981  expressed
as  a percentage  of  birth  rate  from  Sample  Registrabon  System  (3-year  moving  average,  1980-82).
'Nabonal  Family  Health  Survey,  India,  1992-93,  p. 242.
'Nabonal  Family  Health  Survey,  India,  1992-93,  p.  71; Percentages  calculated  from ever  married  women  aged  13-40.Policy Research  Working Paper Series
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